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Clerk of the Court 
Utah Supreme Court 
332 State Capitol Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 UTAH 
Re: State v. Rowe 
Sup. Ct. No- 910165 
Dear Mr. Butler, 
Pursuant to rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, the State cites the following as supplemental authority 
for the proposition expressed in Petitioner's Opening Brief at 22 
n.9 that in analyzing a fourth amendment claim, no separate 
procedural issue of "standing" exists; instead, the question of who 
has a legitimate expectation of privacy is indistinguishable from 
substantive fourth amendment jurisprudence. 
California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1630-31 (1988): 
Individual States may surely construe their own 
constitutions as imposing more stringent constraints on 
police conduct than does the Federal Constitution. We 
have never intimated, however, that whether or not a 
search is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment depends on the law of the particular State in 
which the search occurs. We have emphasized instead that 
the Fourth Amendment analysis must turn on such factors 
as 'our societal understanding that certain areas deserve 
the most scrupulous protection from government invasion. 
[Citations omitted.] We have already concluded that 
society as a whole possesses no such understanding with 
regard to garbage left for collection at the side of a 
public street. Respondent's argument is no less than a 
suggestion that concepts of privacy under the laws of 
each State are to determine the reach of the Fourth 
Amendment. We do not accept this submission. 
(Emphasis in original.) While Greenwood was otherwise cited in the 
State's brief, it was not cited for this proposition. 
Geoff Butler 
Re: State v. Rowe 
June 11, 1992 
Page Two 
Also, in preparing for oral argument, I noticed that some 
copies of Petitioner's Opening Brief were missing the last sentence 
on page 8. In case any of the Court's copies of the brief 
contained this omission, I have enclosed copies of the correct page 
and apologize for the over-sight. 
I appreciate your circulation of this letter to the 
Court. 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Criminal Appeals Division 
CFS:jn 
Enclosures 
cc: Sheldon Carter 
the fourth amendment in the third-party home so as to permit a 
challenge to the validity of the search warrant. By doing so, 
the majority adopted a "legitimately on the premises" test for 
determining whether any constitutionally protected interest of 
defendant's had been infringed by the police action. The 
application of such a test for fourth amendment analysis is in 
conflict with established law. 
The majority of the court of appeals erroneously 
concluded that, before a defendant may be found to have abandoned 
a constitutionally protected interest in property, the state must 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant did not 
abandon the property to "avoid self-incrimination." This 
conclusion erroneously applies a subjective analysis to 
abandonment and is contrary to the prevailing view. 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the court of 
appeals' holding which suppressed the evidence seized and 
reversed defendant's conviction, and should reinstate and affirm 
defendant's conviction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED 
THAT THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE WAS APPLICABLE TO 
A PROCEDURAL VIOLATION OF THE NIGHTTIME 
SEARCH WARRANT PROVISION, UTAH CODE ANN. § 
77-23-5 (1990). 
In challenging the search warrant for the Swickey home, 
defendant never raised an issue of the warrant's substantive 
validity. Instead, defendant limited her argument to the narrow 
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